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I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery, most commonly defined as “the abuse of public office for
private gain,”1 is detrimental in both the public and the private
sector.2 In light of this, the tenets of the anti-bribery provisions of the
1. Ophelie Brunelle-Quraishi, Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Comparative Analysis, 2 NOTRE
DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 101, 111 (2011).
2. See Nancy Zucker Boswell, An Emerging Consensus on Controlling
Corruption, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1165, 1165–66 (1997) (indicating the
unacceptable cost of corruption to private sector earnings and public sector
interests); Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent Developments in Foreign and Domestic
Criminal Commercial Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 151, 151 (stating that
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United Nations Convention Against Corruption (“UNCAC”) harshly
condemn both public and private sector bribery.3 Though the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)—which serves as the primary
instrument of the United States’ compliance with the anti-bribery
provisions of the UNCAC—recently has undergone unprecedented
expansion, it still fails to address the full spectrum of bribery that the
UNCAC criminalizes.4 Despite being non-mandatory, the UNCAC’s
provision prohibiting private sector bribery will have significant
implications for the future of United States federal law and
international law as a whole.
The United States has long acknowledged the issue of bribery in
international business transactions as a serious threat.5 Recently, the
international community as a whole has begun to recognize that
bribery in international commercial transactions is an issue that
deserves attention because of its far-reaching negative
repercussions.6 Consequently, various multinational agreements have
bribery can take the form of corrupt payments between private parties and need not
involve a public actor).
3. E.g., R. Rajesh Babu, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption:
A Critical Overview, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK 3 (Mar. 1, 2006).
4. See Pilot Review Programme: United States of America, U.N. OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME 12 (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.unodc.org/documents/
treaties/UNCAC/PilotReview/USA_Final_Country_Report_UNCAC-PRP.pdf
[hereinafter U.N. Pilot Review Programme] (noting that the FCPA established as a
criminal offense the conduct described in UNCAC Article 16, the bribery of public
foreign officials); see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Response of
the United States of America to the Comprehensive Self-Assessment Checklist, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE 47–48 (July 10, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/docs/USA-UNCAC-Self-Assessment.pdf [hereinafter USA UNCAC SelfAssessment] (showing that, among the measures establishing the United States’
compliance with Article 21 (private sector bribery), the FCPA is not included as a
relevant law).
5. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA.
L. REV. 489, 501 (2011) (asserting that the United States was the first country to
adopt anti-bribery legislation and that it remained the only country with antibribery prohibitions for twenty years after the passage of the FCPA); see also
Thomas J. White, U.S. Efforts to Combat Foreign Corrupt Practices, 92 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 162, 163 (1998) (stating that the United States has
criminalized bribery through the use of the FCPA since 1977).
6. See Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 118 (2010) (reporting that there
have been a series of anti-bribery and anti-corruption international agreements
reached in the past decade); see also Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 103
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been created to address the problem of international commercial
bribery.7 The UNCAC represents the most comprehensive and
inclusive agreement created thus far.8
The United States has signed and ratified the UNCAC,9 which
impresses various obligations related to corruption upon its
signatories.10 Specifically, UNCAC Article 16(1) and Article 21
prohibit international commercial bribery in both the public and the
private sector.11 The FCPA is the United States’ primary instrument
for combating international commercial bribery;12 it does not
explicitly address private sector bribery, however, provoking the
question of whether it can be used to address the spectrum of bribery
incorporated by the UNCAC.13
This comment asserts that the scope of the FCPA has expanded
through emerging enforcement trends toward application in the
private sector; the applicability of the FCPA within the private
sector, however, remains limited. Therefore, the FCPA does not
(acknowledging that the various international anti-corruption agreements that have
been created in a short period of time imply that combating corruption has become
an international priority).
7. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 92 (positing that the creation of significant
anti-corruption international agreements within the past twenty years has
influenced the way United States agencies enforce the FCPA).
8. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 106 (describing the UNCAC as
“the leading international anti-corruption tool”); see also Michael Kubiciel, Core
Criminal Law Provisions in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 9
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 139, 140 (2009) (stating that the UNCAC marks the peak of
the anti-corruption movement within the international community).
9. Misty Robinson, Global Approach to Anti-Bribery and Corruption, an
Overview: Much Done, but a Lot More to Do, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 314
(2012).
10. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 102 (explaining that the UNCAC
covers a spectrum of activities that fall within the “vast concept” of corruption);
see also Robinson, supra note 9, at 308 (discussing the range of corruption
criminalized by the UNCAC and the actions countries must take to prevent
corruption).
11. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption arts. 16, 21, Oct. 31,
2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 154, 156 [hereinafter UNCAC] (addressing the bribery of
foreign public officials in Article 16 and bribery in the private sector in Article 21).
12. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 90 (stating that the FCPA occupies center stage
in the United States’ efforts to address white-collar crime).
13. Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494–95, 497 (asserting that the FCPA has
been in use by the United States for a long time and has been greatly extended
recently through new methods of enforcement).
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comply with both anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC. Part II of
this comment will include background regarding the UNCAC and
FCPA, as well as pertinent information regarding supplemental
agreements that are of use to the present analysis. Part III argues that
the United States does not meet the anti-bribery standards of the
UNCAC because its federal anti-bribery provision, the FCPA, does
not criminalize private sector bribery. Part IV will recommend ways
that the United States can achieve full compliance with the
UNCAC’s anti-bribery obligations, such as by amending the FCPA
or adopting new legislation specifically addressing private sector
bribery. Finally, Part V concludes that the FCPA does not fulfill all
of the United States’ obligations under the UNCAC because it has
not been used against purely private-to-private bribery, which
UNCAC Article 21 prohibits.

II. BACKGROUND
A. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
The UNCAC’s wide acceptance illustrates the global
acknowledgement of corruption’s destructiveness.14 The Ad Hoc
Committee that carried out the negotiations for the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, which was
adopted on November 15, 2000, was the first to propose the need for
a convention specifically addressing corruption.15 Recognizing that
corruption posed too complex an issue to be covered exhaustively by
a convention dealing with transnational organized crime, the United
14. Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 105–06 (finding that the international
community has grown increasingly aware of the consequences of corruption and is
eager to take action, as illustrated by the UNAC garnering 140 signatures and fifty
ratifications within four months after it entered into force).
15. See Dimitri Vlassis, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
Origins and Negotiation Process, U.N. ASIA & FAR E. INST. FOR THE PREVENTION
OF CRIME & THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS 127, http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/
pdf/RS_No66/No66_16VE_Vlassis2.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (stating that the
question of a convention against corruption was first raised in connection with the
negotiations for the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime);
Antonio Argandoña, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption and Its
Impact on International Companies, 3 (Univ. of Navarra IESE Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 656, 2006) (explaining that the United Nations decided that it was
desirable to have an international legal instrument against corruption independent
of the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime).
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Nations (“UN”) eventually established the UNCAC.16
Convention entered into force on December 14, 2005.17
The Convention has three stated purposes:

[29:3
The

(a) To promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption
more efficiently and effectively; (b) To promote, facilitate and support
international cooperation and technical assistance in the prevention of and
fight against corruption, including in asset recovery; (c) To promote
integrity, accountability and proper management of public affairs and
public property.18

The goal of the UNCAC is to provide a comprehensive
international instrument that establishes a common language and
guidelines to unify international corruption legislation.19
The FCPA is the United States’ domestic means of criminalizing
bribery per the requirements of the UNCAC.20 Compliance with the
UNCAC is monitored through a system of peer review.21 The
UNCAC assigns the responsibility of periodically reviewing the
Member States’ implementation of the UNCAC to the Conference of
the State Parties to the Convention.22 Consequently, Poland and
Sweden reviewed the United States in 2009.23 Though the review did

16. Vlassis, supra note 15, at 127; see also Argandoña, supra note 15, at 3
(noting that the Ad Hoc Committee for the negotiation of the convention met for
the first time in 2001 and held seven official sessions between 2002 and 2003 in
Vienna).
17. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 307.
18. UNCAC, supra note 11, at 146.
19. See Argandoña, supra note 15, at 4 (recognizing that the approach of
UNCAC toward unifying international corruption regulation is limited by the
recognition of state sovereignty and numerous differences between State Parties,
such as their various levels of economic development).
20. See USA UNCAC Self-Assessment, supra note 4, at 12 (identifying the
FCPA as the applicable U.S. law implementing the measures described in Article
16(1)).
21. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 136 (describing the UNCAC’s peer
review mechanism as a non-adversarial systematic examination and assessment of
the performance of a state by other states which relies on mutual trust and a shared
confidence in the process); Robinson, supra note 9, at 308 (stating that the
UNCAC requires states to cooperate closely with each other in all aspects of the
fight against corruption).
22. See UNCAC, supra note 11, at 151–52 (listing mechanisms for proper
implementation of the UNCAC).
23. U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 1.
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not examine all UNCAC articles,24 the review team identified the
FCPA as a successful method of compliance with Article 16(1).25
The UNCAC as a whole has a wide scope; this comment,
however, will focus primarily on the UNCAC’s criminalization of
bribery in international business transactions by Articles 16(1) and
21.26 Article 16 “Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and Officials of
Public International Organizations” states,
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may
be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, the promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or
an official of a public international organization, directly or indirectly, of
an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person
or entity, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise
of his or her official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other
undue advantage in relation to the conduct of international business. 27

The UNCAC defines a foreign public official as “any person
holding a legislative, executive, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; and any person
exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a
public agency or public enterprise.”28 Article 16(1) is a mandatory
provision while Article 21 is non-mandatory.29
In an effort to compromise between the United States’ objections
to criminalizing bribery in the private sector and Europe’s desire to
prohibit bribery in the private sector, the parties to the negotiation

24. See id. at 2 (stating the review examined the following articles: “5
(preventative anti-corruption policies and practices); 15 (bribery of national public
officials); 16 (bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public
international organizations); 17 (embezzlement, misappropriation or other
diversion of property by a public official); 25 (obstruction of justice); 46 (mutual
legal assistance) . . . and 53 (measures for direct recovery of property)”).
25. Id. at 12–13 (stating that the FCPA is sufficient to bring the United States
into compliance with the requirements of UNCAC Article 16(1)).
26. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 307–08 (observing that the UNCAC
concerns the prevention of corruption in its member countries’ public and private
sectors and also calls for the investigation and prosecution of corruption).
27. UNCAC, supra note 11, at 154.
28. Id. at 147.
29. Kubiciel, supra note 8, at 141 (stating that although several articles of the
UNCAC are non-mandatory provisions, the UNCAC makes certain core provisions
mandatory).
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process made Article 21 non-mandatory.30 Article 21 “Bribery in the
Private Sector” states,
Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when
committed intentionally in the course of economic, financial or
commercial activities: (a) The promise, offering or giving, directly or
indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person who directs or works, in
any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself or herself
or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or her
duties, act or refrain from acting; (b) The solicitation or acceptance,
directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage by any person who directs or
works, in any capacity, for a private sector entity, for the person himself
or herself or for another person, in order that he or she, in breach of his or
her duties, act or refrain from acting.31

No supplementary official or semi-official commentary to the
UNCAC exists.32

B. THE FCPA: THE UNITED STATES’ DOMESTIC METHOD OF
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNCAC’S ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS
Congress enacted the FCPA in 1977.33 The law prohibits any
issuer, domestic concern, or any person from “mak[ing] use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value.”34 To
constitute an offence under the FCPA, these acts must be directed to
“any foreign official,” “any foreign political party or official thereof
or any candidate for foreign political office,” or “any person, while
30. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (discussing the contentions
between the United States and the EU during the Convention negotiations
regarding the inclusion of a private-sector bribery prohibition within the UNCAC).
31. UNCAC, supra note 11, at 156.
32. See Kubiciel, supra note 8, at 139 (discussing that without an official or
semi-official commentary concerning the content of the UNCAC it is difficult for
Member States to implement the provisions).
33. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 92–93 (explaining that the Watergate scandal
was a driving force behind the FCPA’s enactment in 1977; investigations into
illegal accounts and illicit payments connected to the Nixon campaign led to the
conclusion that the rash of illegal and illicit payments could be curbed if legislation
could punish companies that disguised bribes in their books).
34. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998).
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knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be
offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign
official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any
candidate for foreign political office.”35 The FCPA defines a foreign
official as
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf
of any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for
or on behalf of any public international organization.36

Additionally, the bribe must have one of the following purposes:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any
act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any
improper advantage; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use his
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or
influence any act or decision of such government or instrumentality, in
order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person.37

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) must prove the above-stated elements
to determine whether bribery has occurred.38
When enacted, the primary objective of the Act was to target illicit
bribes made by United States firms to foreign officials.39 As the
global environment changed, however, the FCPA had to adapt.40
Consequently, the Act has been amended twice, once in 1988 and
again in 1998.41 The United States has pursued violations of the
35. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3).
36. Id. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
37. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(A)–(B).
38. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 94 (noting that the FCPA contains a list of
requirements that the SEC and DOJ must meet to prove bribery has occurred).
39. Id. at 93.
40. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 105 (stating that the UNCAC is a
product of a heightened consciousness of corruption as a growing threat).
41. Bixby, supra note 6, at 97, 101 (discussing how the 1998 amendments
broadened the scope of the FCPA to cover any individual who could be considered
an agent of a corporation or any official, regardless of governmental level, in a
foreign nation).
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FCPA, both criminally and civilly, for incidents of bribery within
international business transactions.42 The FCPA’s successful
structure has been used as a model and motivation for the
international community to address the problem of corruption.43

C. THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: ASSESSING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF THE
FCPA
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) closely
parallels the approach of the FCPA.44 It was created under strong
pressure from the United States due to the United States’ desire to
encourage the criminalization of bribery in international business
transactions.45 The OECD Convention is narrowly tailored to
specifically address international commercial bribery of foreign
public officials46 and represents the first multilateral agreement to
criminalize bribery.47 The OECD Convention entered into force in
42. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 314 (observing that, in recent years, the
SEC and DOJ have widely enforced the FCPA against violations that affect or
concern the United States).
43. See Abiola Makinwa, The Rules Regulating Transnational Bribery
Achieving a Common Standard?, 2007 INT’L BUS. L.J. 17, 18–19 (arguing that the
FCPA is “the cornerstone upon which the . . . international anti-corruption
framework has been built”).
44. Id. at 26 (observing that of all anti-corruption instruments, the OECD
Convention follows most closely the approach of the FCPA); White, supra note 5,
at 163 (stating that the United States was very involved in the OECD Convention’s
negotiations and gave important input to the administration throughout the
negotiation process).
45. Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption:
Global Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 195–96
(2005).
46. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 306 (stating that the OECD Convention
criminalizes the bribery of foreign public officials in international commercial
transactions and requires parties to the Convention to: (1) adhere to the
Convention’s interpretation of the “bribery of a foreign public officer,” (2)
promote international cooperation, and (3) enforce the anticorruption legislation).
47. See White, supra note 5, at 163 (recognizing that the OECD Convention
was unprecedented in the way it criminalized bribery of foreign public officials,
including payments to officials of public agencies, public enterprises, and public
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1999.48
The OECD Convention states,
Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish that
it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly
or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or
for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business.49

The OECD Convention defines a foreign official as “any person
holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a foreign
country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a public
function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or
public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international
organisation.”50
The monitoring mechanism of the OECD Convention has
conducted extensive assessment of U.S. compliance under the
FCPA.51 The results of such monitoring provide a thorough analysis
of the FCPA and identify divergent areas between the FCPA and the
OECD.52
international organizations).
48. E.g., Webb, supra note 45, at 195.
49. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions and Related Documents, art. 1, May 23, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.
50. Id. art. 1(4)(a).
51. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 306 (describing how the OECD has
incorporated compliance measures entailing annual peer-review monitoring, which
evaluates the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the Convention,
assesses whether a country is applying the legislation effectively, and focuses on
enforcement of the Convention and any outstanding recommendations); see also
Phase One Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the
United States, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 1 (Apr. 1999),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/2390377.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Phase One Report] (stating that the United States signed the
OECD Convention on December 17, 1997, ratified it on November 10, 1998, and
deposited its instrument of ratification with the OECD on December 8, 1998).
52. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 100 (stating that upon the establishment of the
OECD Convention, the United States amended the FCPA to properly align the
FCPA with the OECD Convention).
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The OECD Convention strives to use domestic law to combat the
bribery of foreign public officials.53 An assessment of the United
States’ compliance with its obligations under the UNCAC will
demonstrate that the FCPA’s expansiveness—which is greater than
that of the OECD Convention—is indicative of the FCPA’s
increasing scope.54

D. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES:
INTERPRETING THE UNCAC
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”)—which entered into force on January 27, 198055—
offers guidelines with which to interpret the UNCAC and the
obligations it imposes. The increasing importance of treaties as a
source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful
cooperation among nations provided the impetus for a common
standard to interpret all international treaties.56 Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention states, “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 57
An analysis of the FCPA under this provision will determine whether
the FCPA fulfills the United States’ anti-bribery obligations under
the UNCAC.

53. See Webb, supra note 45, at 195–96 (discussing the importance of the
OECD Convention as an innovative effort to guide the anticorruption activities of
governments that influence the flow of most of the world’s investments, trades,
and goods).
54. See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 1 (stating that the newly
amended FCPA is the domestic legislation used by the United States to fulfill the
requirements of the OECD Convention); Phase Three Report on Implementing the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in the United States, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 27–28 (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/anti-briberyconvention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf
[hereinafter
OECD Phase Three Report] (noting that while it is unclear whether the scope of
the FCPA definition of “foreign public official” includes a person exercising a
public function for a public enterprise or applies in cases where a benefit is
directed to a third party by a foreign official, U.S. courts and agencies are inclined
to interpret the term expansively).
55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 332–33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
56. Id.
57. Id. art. 31.
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E. UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY ACT
Other nations have enacted FCPA-comparable anti-bribery
legislation that prohibits bribery of foreign public officials, while
simultaneously surpassing the FCPA by prohibiting private sector
bribery as well: the United Kingdom is one such nation.58 The United
Kingdom Bribery Act (“UK Bribery Act”) entered into force on July
1, 2011.59 The UK Bribery Act criminalizes a wide spectrum of
bribery, ranging from the bribery of a foreign official60 to the bribery
of any other person without distinguishing between the public and
private sector, stating:
(1) A person (“P”) is guilty of an offence if . . . (a) P offers, promises or
gives a financial or other advantage to another person, and (b) P intends
the advantage – (i) to induce a person to perform improperly a relevant
function or activity, or (ii) to reward a person for the improper
performance of such a function or activity. 61

Additionally, the UK Bribery Act expands corporate liability for
bribery in international business transactions by allocating liability to
the corporation for the actions taken by an actor associated with the
corporation. Section seven of the UK Bribery Act states,
[a] relevant commercial organisation (“C”) is guilty of an offence under
this section if a person (“A”) associated with C bribes another person
intending—(a) to obtain or retain business for C, or (b) to obtain or retain
58. See discussion infra Part III.C (comparing the UK Bribery Act and the
FCPA).
59. See Press Release, Ministry of Justice, UK Clamps Down on Corruption
with
New
Bribery
Act
(Mar.
30,
2011),
available
at
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-clamps-down-on-corruption-with-newbribery-act (asserting that the United Kingdom will reinforce its reputation as a
leader in the global fight against corruption when the Bribery Act enters into force
on July 1, 2011).
60. Bribery Act § 6, c. 23 (2010) (stating that a person who bribes a foreign
public official (“F”) is guilty of an offense if that person’s intention is to influence
F in F’s capacity as a foreign public official).
61. Id. § 1; see also Lee G. Dunst et al., Hot Off the Press: Resetting the
Global Anti-Corruption Thermostat to the UK Bribery Act, 12 BUS. L. INT’L 257,
278 (2011) (clarifying that the provision against private bribery differs from the
provision against the bribery of a foreign public official by stating that “the
financial advantage must induce the person to perform a relevant function or
activity improperly or reward the person for such improper performance, or the
payer must know or believe that accepting the advantage would itself constitute
improper performance of the relevant function or activity”).

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

730

[29:3

an advantage in the conduct of business for C. 62

This provision is not limited to the bribery of a foreign public
official and could reach the overseas actions of foreign persons
associated with a British company, thereby vastly widening the scope
of the UK Bribery Act.63
The extensive scope of the UK Bribery Act encompasses the
offense of bribing another person, the offense of being bribed, and
the organizational offense of failing to prevent bribery. 64 The
implementation of the UK Bribery Act has brought the United
Kingdom into compliance with its international treaty obligations.65

III. ANALYSIS
This section first discusses the Vienna Convention as the standard
under which to interpret the UNCAC. Second, this section asserts
that the FCPA does not meet the UNCAC’s Article 21 anti-bribery
provision through a textual interpretation of the respective
documents and how they are, and are not, similar. This section will
then consider the issue through a more theoretical approach,
concluding that, in its application, the FCPA nears compliance in a
limited capacity with UNCAC Article 21. Third, it argues that the
antiquity of the FCPA prevents it from meeting the broader purpose
of the UNCAC and compares the FCPA against the 2010 United
Kingdom Bribery Act. Finally, this section assesses the UNCAC
negotiations to determine their implications for the United States’
dogmatic perspective regarding anti-bribery legislation.

62. Bribery Act § 7.
63. See Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Note, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative
Reform in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement,
49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 390 (2011) (expressing that the language of
Section 7 of the UK Bribery Act “would potentially cover new actors and expand
the scope of British jurisdiction beyond that envisioned by the American regime”).
64. See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 277 (setting forth the additional offenses
proscribed by the UK Bribery Act in addition to the offense of bribing a foreign
official).
65. See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 400 (asserting that the UK Bribery Act is a
vast improvement in British anti-bribery law, specifying that the addition of the
offense for foreign bribery brings the United Kingdom into compliance with its
international treaty obligations).
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A. ANALYSIS OF THE UNCAC UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
In interpreting the UNCAC as it applies to the United States, the
Vienna Convention dictates that the UNCAC be read in accordance
with its ordinary meaning as well as the overall context and goals of
the Convention.66 Although the United States is not an official
signatory of the Vienna Convention, it considers the Vienna
Convention instructive.67 Therefore, an assessment of the United
States’ obligations under the UNCAC must go beyond the blackletter text of the Convention and consider the purpose of the
UNCAC.68 Both the UNCAC and the FCPA share a similar
objective, to combat bribery; the text of the UNCAC, however, is
more expansive than that of the FCPA.69

B. ALTHOUGH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UNCAC AND FCPA ARE
COMPARABLE, THE UNCAC ACKNOWLEDGES ACTS OF BRIBERY
THAT ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE FCPA
The precedent of United States predominance in combating
international bribery in commercial transactions is being replaced by
66. See Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 31 (stating that not only must a
treaty be interpreted in “good faith” and in conformance with its “ordinary
meaning,” but it must be understood according to its purpose and context—which
includes its preamble and annexes—as well as subsequent agreements and
practices in application).
67. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited July 28, 2013) (stating
that though the United States has not signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, it considers many of the provisions to constitute customary international
law).
68. See id. (requiring that the interpretation of a treaty must include any
agreement and instrument made in connection with the creation of the treaty,
before or after its conclusion, and that special meaning should be given to certain
terms of the treaty if the parties so intended).
69. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against
Corruption, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 80 (2006) (explaining that the UNCAC created a
“global framework for combating corruption”); see also Barbara Crutchfield
George et al., On the Threshold of the Adoption of Global Antibribery Legislation:
A Critical Analysis of Current Domestic and International Efforts Toward the
Reduction of Business Corruption, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5 (1999)
(affirming that the FCPA combats bribery by being the first legislation worldwide
that criminalizes the bribery by business entities as opposed to criminalizing the
acceptance of bribes by government officials).
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the innovative progression of the international community.70 The
primary objective of the FCPA when it was instituted as the United
States’ primary mechanism for addressing the problem of
international bribery was to combat illicit bribes made by United
States firms to foreign officials.71 Alternatively, the UNCAC has
created a new precedent for anti-bribery legislation by instigating the
possibility of making bribery in the private sector a criminal
offense.72 Although the UNCAC does not make the prohibition of
private sector bribery mandatory—preventing the United States from
being in violation of its UNCAC obligations—the provision remains
important because its inclusion within the UNCAC contributes to the
overall objective of the Convention and signals a shift in
international law.73 Despite being non-mandatory, Article 21 will
have significant implications for the future of the United States’
federal policy regarding bribery in international commercial
transactions.74
First, this section evaluates the plain meaning of the FCPA to
determine whether, based solely on the Act’s language, the FCPA
satisfies Article 16(1) and Article 21 of the UNCAC, respectively.
Next, this section will take a theoretical approach, interpreting
whether the application of the FCPA expands its scope to satisfy the
70. See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 50 (commending the
U.S. government for its visible and high level of support for the fight against
bribery of foreign officials); see also U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4,
at 12 (stating that the FCPA is “reported to be a significant priority” for the DOJ);
Robinson, supra note 9, at 314 (explaining that U.S. enforcement agencies have
received praise for their frequent initiation of such international cooperation in
deterring foreign bribery).
71. See generally Bixby, supra note 6, at 93 (discussing the purpose and two
primary provisions of the FCPA when it was first enacted).
72. See Argandoña, supra note 15, at 7 (stating that the UNCAC has
incorporated this possibility in Article 21).
73. See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 19 (mandating that “[e]ach State Party
shall consider adopting” legislation prohibiting private sector bribery); Boswell,
supra note 2, at 1166 (stating that the issue of corruption has become a priority in
international law, politically and economically, because of a combination of
interests regarding corruption in the public and private sectors in many countries);
discussion infra Part III.D (discussing the emerging international consensus on the
need to prohibit private sector bribery in international commercial transactions as
illustrated by the UNCAC negotiations).
74. See discussion infra Part III.B.2–3 (examining the way in which the U.S.
policy regarding the use of the FCPA is already expanding beyond the scope of
foreign public officials).
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anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC. Finally, after concluding that
the FCPA fails to incorporate both anti-bribery provisions of the
UNCAC, this section argues that the FCPA’s expansive scope,
demonstrated by its application against public enterprises and
resulting from the blurring lines between the private and public
sectors, may indicate further compliance with the UNCAC than a
textual reading might suggest.
1. A Strictly Textual Assessment Reveals that the FCPA Does Not
Prohibit the Full Scope of Bribery Addressed within the UNCAC
The provision addressing bribery of foreign public officials within
the UNCAC is based on the language of similar agreements that have
come before it.75 This premise is illustrated by the comparable
components of Article 16(1) and the FCPA.76 The scope of the FCPA
encompasses the prohibitions of Article 16(1), thereby satisfying one
aspect of the anti-bribery initiative the UNCAC seeks to address.77
A prima facie comparison of the UNCAC Article 16(1) and the
FCPA reveals the compatibility of the two provisions.78 First, both
provisions require similar actions to constitute the offense of bribery
of a foreign public official.79 Second, the requisite purposes of the
75. See Indira Carr, The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a
Real Difference to the Quality of Life of Millions?, 34 MANCHESTER J. INT’L
ECON. L., no. 3, 2006, at 3, 20 (stating that this offense is found in Article 16 of the
UNCAC and that, in drafting it, the UNCAC “mimic[ked] . . . the language found
in other anti-corruption conventions”).
76. See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 25 (asserting that transnational bribery
rules have a number of elements in common).
77. See U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 12 (stating that the
FCPA complies with UNCAC Article 16(1) by criminalizing the conduct described
within Article 16(1)).
78. See USA UNCAC Self-Assessment, supra note 4, at 16 (stating that the text
of the FCPA sufficiently establishes the provisions of Article 16(1) as a criminal
offense).
79. Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16(1) (requiring an act of
promising, offering, or giving to constitute bribery), and Brunelle-Quraishi, supra
note 1, at 111 (stating that the UNCAC specifically criminalizes the “offering,
giving, promising, acceptance, and solicitation of any ‘undue advantage’”), with
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1) (1998)
(listing similar conduct, such as an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization
of the payment of any money, as acts of bribery), and OECD Phase One Report,
supra note 51, at 3 (asserting that the FCPA requirement to offer, promise, or give
proof of an act in furtherance establishes that the defendant committed himself to
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bribe in order to constitute an offense are comparable in both the
FCPA and the UNCAC Article 16(1).80 Third, both provisions use
the same language to identify the recipient of the bribe.81 While there
exists some discrepancy in the language because of the UNCAC’s
direct prohibition of the bribery of an official of a public
international organization, the FCPA definition of a foreign official
encompasses any officer or employee of a public international
organization, thereby satisfying all elements of UNCAC Article
16(1).82 Finally, both provisions include a safeguard, requiring intent
in order for liability for the offense of bribery of a foreign public
official to exist.83 A textual comparison of UNCAC Article 16(1) and
the FCPA shows that the FCPA meets the obligations created by
Article 16(1).84
doing the act and thereafter performed some act to accomplish the objective).
80. Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16(1) (requiring that the act of
bribery by an official be to intentionally obtain or retain business or other undue
advantage in relation to the conduct of international business, as long as the official
acts or refrains from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties), and U.N.
Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 12, with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(A)–
(B) (necessitating that the purpose of the bribe be to influence a foreign official in
his official capacity or to secure an undue advantage), and OECD Phase One
Report, supra note 51, at 3 (stating that the two categories of improper benefits
prohibited by the FCPA are the offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of any money and the offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value).
81. Compare UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 16 (requiring the act of bribery to be
directed at a “foreign public official or an official of a public international
organization . . . for the official himself or herself or another person or entity”),
with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(1)–(3) (necessitating that these actions be directed to any
foreign official, any foreign political party or official thereof, or any candidate for
foreign political office, or other person, knowing that the payment to that other
person would be passed on to a foreign official, foreign political party or official
thereof or candidate for foreign political office).
82. See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (expanding on the
definition of “foreign official” to include “any officer or employee of a ‘political
international organization’” or a third person acting in an official capacity on
behalf of such an organization).
83. See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 15 (stating that under provisions of the
UNCAC, bribery is considered an offense when committed intentionally); 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (requiring the impetus for the bribe to be corruption); OECD
Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 2 (clarifying that by requiring corrupt intent,
the FCPA prohibits all payments to foreign officials “regardless of whether that
official would have acted or not acted without the payment being made”).
84. See U.N. Pilot Review Programme, supra note 4, at 13 (“The U.S. has
adopted the measures required in accordance with UNCAC Article 16(1).”).

2014]

THE CRIMINALIZATION OF BRIBERY

735

A surface reading of the FCPA indicates that the Act only
prohibits bribery in the public sector and therefore does not address
the private sector bribery restriction of UNCAC Article 21.85 The
FCPA’s limited provisions distinguish it from the UNCAC, which
criminalizes bribery in the private sector in addition to the public
sector.86 In contrast to Article 16(1), Article 21 prohibits the bribery
of any person and does not require association with a foreign public
official to establish liability.87 Conversely, the FCPA does not
recognize the bribery of just any person as an offense. 88 Thus, a
strictly textual reading of the FCPA prompts the conclusion that the
FCPA does not fulfill both tenets of the UNCAC’s anti-bribery
regime.
2. The Application of the FCPA Implies that the FCPA Nearly
Encompasses the Form of Bribery Recognized by Article 21, yet
Fails to Fully Incorporate the Actions Prohibited by
UNCAC Article 21
The application of the FCPA indicates that the doctrine has a
wider scope than its language would suggest. The FCPA’s original
purpose was to address bribery of foreign officials, completely
satisfying the UNCAC’s Article 16 prohibition against the bribery of
foreign public officials.89 While the U.S. government did not enact
the FCPA with the intent to address bribery in the private sector, the
increasing global attention towards private sector bribery has
corresponded with the broadening scope of the FCPA.90
85. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 94 (stating that the anti-bribery provisions of
the FCPA are meant to deter corporations from using bribery to influence their
business with officials of foreign nations).
86. See UNCAC, supra note 11, art. 21 (prohibiting bribery in the private
sector by making it a criminal offense).
87. See id. art. 21(a) (criminalizing the promise, offering, soliciting or
acceptance, or giving, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage to any person).
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(1)–(3) (prohibiting the direct or indirect bribery
of a foreign official or foreign political party).
89. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 311 (listing Congress’ purposes for
enacting the FCPA as “to prohibit bribery of foreign officials and to promote fair
business practices, integrity, and accountability and the efficient and equitable
distribution of economic resources”).
90. See id. at 310 (reporting that in 2011 the Bribe Index looked at businessto-business bribery for the first time and found that companies are almost as likely
to pay bribes to other businesses as they are to public officials).
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The DOJ and SEC have exaggerated extensively the alreadyexpansive view of the FCPA’s requisite elements in recent FCPA
actions.91 The FCPA has consistently been applied extraterritorially,
provided that the act in question triggers further acts to occur in the
United States.92 Additionally, an expansive aspect of the FCPA is
that it prohibits the offer of a bribe; therefore, no affirmative action is
needed to violate the FCPA.93 In the last few years, however, the
interpretation of the FCPA has become significantly more
extensive.94 The conclusion of the most recent OECD Phase Report
underscores this expansion, explaining that the FCPA has become
broader than the purely “anti-bribery directed towards public foreign
official” scope of the OECD Convention because the FCPA has been
used against persons not considered public officials under the OECD
Convention.95 The recent evolution of the applicability of the FCPA,
expanding the scope of the Act, has signaled stronger U.S.
conformity with UNCAC Article 21’s prohibition of private sector
bribery.96
The FCPA does not have a clearly defined boundary; rather, the
FCPA can be interpreted to have a narrow scope that only applies to
payments that are made in order to obtain a foreign official’s
91. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 530 (stating that although the DOJ and
SEC typically have taken a very broad view of the provisions of the FCPA in the
past, the enforcement agencies have become even more expansive in their
interpretation of the FCPA recently).
92. See Carolyn Lindsey, More than you Bargained For: Successor Liability
Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 962
(discussing the far-reaching jurisdiction of the FCPA, in that “arguably the
authorization of a wire transfer intended to pay a bribe that hits a U.S. bank
account is enough to put a foreign company under the territorial jurisdiction of the
FCPA”).
93. See id. (arguing that money or a gift does not actually need to change
hands to constitute a bribe in violation of the FCPA, and that just an offer suffices
as a violation).
94. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 530 (discussing how the expansion of
FCPA enforcement has gone as far as the SEC using FCPA authority to apply
existing laws in “novel and creative ways,” consequently “broadening the scope of
liability for the regulated community,” which some consider “hyper aggressive”).
95. See OECD Phase Three, supra note 54, at 27 (stating that whether the
FCPA covers a person exercising a public function for a foreign country or a
public enterprise must be determined in order to clarify the definition of a foreign
public official).
96. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494 (asserting that the “relatively recent
radicalization” of FCPA enforcement has changed the substance of the law).
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approval regarding international business transactions.97 However, a
broader reading of the FCPA, to cover payments that indirectly help
the person offering the bribe to obtain or retain foreign business,
provides a more accurate interpretation.98 The FCPA continuously
has received liberal application, largely by attributing a pliable
definition to the term “foreign official” as the instrument of evolution
towards the FCPA’s application in the private sector and,
consequently, compliance with UNCAC Article 21.99
The primary method of expanding the application of the FCPA to
bribery in the private sector as encompassed by UNCAC Article 21
is the increasing use of the FCPA against public enterprises. 100 The
term “instrumentality” within the definition of a public official has
been interpreted broadly to bring public enterprises within the
purview of the FCPA.101 The inclusion of public enterprises within
the scope of the FCPA illustrates U.S. deference to UNCAC Article
21 by bringing entities not directly employed by the government
within the jurisdiction of the FCPA.102 The United States justifies the
97. Makinwa, supra note 43, at 19.
98. See id. at 19 (suggesting that the most likely result of the debate regarding
the scope of the FCPA, caused by the somewhat ambiguous language of the act, is
that the act should be widely interpreted); see also Bixby, supra note 6, at 100–01
(stating that the 1998 amendment of the FCPA significantly expanded the reach of
the act by including “any individual who could be considered an agent of a
corporation or any official, regardless of governmental level, in a foreign nation”
under the purview of the FCPA).
99. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 531 (suggesting that the definition of a
“foreign official” as used in the FCPA is arguably “the most contentious point of
FCPA interpretation”).
100. See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28 (stating that since the
last Report there have been positive legal developments regarding the application
of the FCPA against the bribery of a person exercising a public function for a
public enterprise).
101. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 533 (stating that the DOJ has regularly
indicated that it takes a more expansive view of the “agency or instrumentality”
component of the FCPA to encompass quasi-governmental bodies and
consideration of the “role performed by the entity or the government’s influence”).
102. Compare OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (noting that the
FCPA’s definition of foreign official does not reference public enterprises, nor are
public enterprises mentioned in the act itself), and OECD Phase Three Report,
supra note 54, at 28 (identifying the lack of official determination as to whether
the definition of a foreign public official covers a person exercising a public
function for a foreign country, including for a public enterprise), with OECD
Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (explaining that public enterprises
incorporate employees of instrumentalities of foreign governments as being
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inclusion of public enterprises by asserting that Congress expressly
intended to include state-owned enterprises and the employees of
those enterprises in the definition of a foreign official.103 The
expansive amount of businesses now considered foreign officials due
to the interpretation of the term “instrumentality” resembles the
prohibition of private bribery in UNCAC Article 21 because
transactions between businesses exercising primarily private
functions are now susceptible to FCPA enforcement.104
The second significant factor behind the expansion towards FCPA
application in the private sector is the blurring of the line between the
two sectors.105 Many countries have seen increasing government
involvement within the alleged private sector for various reasons,
such as the nature of the respective governments or in response to a
need generated by the current state of the economy.106 The resulting
foreign officials and that this provision covers officers, directors, and employees of
state enterprises), and Westbrook, supra note 5, at 535 (stating that the term
“instrumentality” has been interpreted to include state-owned or controlled
enterprises, making employees of such enterprises foreign officials for the
purposes of the FCPA).
103. OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28.
104. See OECD Phase One Report, supra note 51, at 6 (discussing the factors
the DOJ considers in categorizing an entity as a public enterprise, including the
characterization of the enterprise and its employees, “the purpose of the
enterprise,” and “the degree of control exercised over the enterprise by the foreign
government;” the DOJ has qualified a vast amount of businesses, and consequently
their employees, as being controlled or owned by foreign governments, resulting in
their treatment as instrumentalities of the foreign government). But see Kubiciel,
supra note 8, at 151 (stating that the UNCAC’s goal of broad criminalization is
accomplished through including “both public officials by statute and those by
function” in its definition of a foreign public official); Brunelle-Quraishi, supra
note 1, at 112 (explaining that the concept of a foreign official as used by the
UNCAC encompasses a wide array of categories and that the interpretation of a
foreign official under the UNCAC will be left to the discretion of each Member
State).
105. See Webb, supra note 45, at 212 (declaring that a reason behind the global
recognition of the problem of private sector corruption is the line between the
public and private sector being blurred by privatization and outsourcing); BrunelleQuraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (explaining that regional instruments have begun
including private sector corruption because the line between the public and private
sector is becoming increasingly blurred, accrediting this trend to outsourcing and
the rapid growth of the private sector in some countries); Babu, supra note 3, at 18
(affirming that the line between the two sectors is blurred by privatization,
outsourcing and other developments).
106. For example, due to the pervasive presence of the Chinese government in
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vulnerability of entities outside the traditional concept of a public
foreign official, as represented by UNCAC Article 16(1), to FCPA
litigation brings the FCPA closer to accommodating the private
bribery provision of UNCAC Article 21 but ultimately fails to fully
incorporate the provision.107
3. The Extensive Scope of the FCPA Is Illustrated by Case Law
Recent cases demonstrate how the FCPA has expanded in a way
that implies a growing U.S. conformity with the larger scope of antibribery objectives of the UNCAC, manifested by Article 21. In 2008,
Nam Quoc Nguyen pled guilty to violating the FCPA by bribing
employees of a Vietnamese government-owned company.108 Nguyen
was the founder and President of Nexus Technologies, which
exported a wide variety of equipment and technology to its
customers in Vietnam.109 The company obtained business by paying
bribes to rig bids and receive confidential information.110 For
purposes of the FCPA, the bribes were being paid to foreign officials
because Vietnamese government agencies controlled Nexus
the private sector, entities of the socialized medical system—including nurses, lab
technicians, and family members of employees—have been considered foreign
officials. Additionally, the global stimulus plan has resulted in the categorization
of many large companies as foreign officials for the purposes of the FCPA due to
governmental assistance, such as the Royal Bank of Scotland, which is now 68.4%
owned by the UK government. Furthermore, the rise in cross-border investments—
many governmentally-controlled—in companies during the economic crises will
result in the inclusion of those companies within the FCPA definition of foreign
officials, such as the Singapore Investment Corporation, which is now closely
connected with the Singaporean government. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 534–
35 (stating that recent cases have exhibited an unprecedented expansion of the
definition of foreign official).
107. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 91 (noting that “whenever U.S. business
crosses a border, an FCPA investigation is now a distinct possibility”).
108. E.g., Guilty Plea Agreement at 1–2, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-5221 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2009) (stating the specific charges to which the defendant,
Nam Quoc Nguyen, was pleading guilty).
109. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-522-1 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
4, 2008) (specifying that the company exported underwater mapping equipment,
bomb containment equipment, helicopter parts, chemical detectors, satellite
communication parts, and air tracking systems).
110. See id. at 6 (explaining that the manner and means of the conspiracy
included the defendant paying bribes to a Hong Kong Company which then
funneled the funds to Vietnamese government officials as a way to obtain lucrative
contracts).
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Technology customers.111
This case reflects a shift towards a more expansive interpretation
of the FCPA, nearing the incorporation of Article 21 of the UNCAC,
because the U.S. government held companies and their employees
exercising private functions liable under the FCPA.112 The United
States justifies this expansion by asserting that a public purpose is
only one of many factors used to determine if an organization is an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign government and claiming that
Congress intended to include employees of state-owned enterprises
in the definition of a foreign official.113 The U.S. government’s
rationalization of the use of the FCPA, although an unprecedented
expansion of its scope, implicitly acknowledges that a doctrine
focused solely on public officials will no longer adequately deter
bribery in international business transactions.114 While U.S. v. Nam
Quoc Nguyen reflects a positive United States policy shift towards
addressing bribery in the private sector, this shift leaves many
unsuspecting companies vulnerable to litigation due to the
unprecedented expansion of FCPA application.115
Another example of an FCPA case that illustrates the FCPA’s

111. See id. at 3–4 (discussing the various government entities involved: Vung
Tau Airport and Southern Flight Management Center, controlled by the Ministry of
Transport; Viestovpetro Joint Venture and Petro Vietnam Gas Company,
controlled by the Ministry of Industry; and Tourism and Trading Company,
controlled by Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Safety. The Hong Kong Company was
used to facilitate the payments of bribes to and for the benefit of Vietnamese
government officials; therefore, these companies and their employees were
departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the Government of Vietnam and,
consequently, foreign officials).
112. See OECD Phase Three Report, supra note 54, at 28 (stating that the
defendants argued that they could not be held liable under the FCPA because the
definition of a foreign official does not include employees of a state owned
enterprise and that for an organization to be considered an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign government, it must serve a “purely public purpose”).
113. See id. (discussing the response of the U.S. government to the defendants’
argument, rationalizing the extension of the definition of an agency or
instrumentality in order for the FCPA to apply to the claim).
114. See id. (presenting the United States’ response to the defendants’
challenges against the use of the FCPA when involving employees of state-owned
enterprises in the case of Nam Quoc Nguyen).
115. See Indictment, supra note 109, at 6 (stating that defendants paid bribes to
Vietnamese “government officials,” referring to agents of companies owned in part
by the Vietnamese government).
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expansion into the private sector is U.S. v. Kellogg Brown & Root. In
2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”) pled guilty to conspiring to
violate the FCPA.116 KBR executives allegedly bribed Nigeria LNG
Limited (“NLNG”), a company created to develop the Bonny Island
Project and award all related contracts.117 The Nigerian government
controlled forty-nine percent of NLNG.118 This case is significant
because it demonstrates the increasing use of the FCPA within
largely non-governmental businesses sectors. Though the
government was not a dominating influence over NLNG, it owned
the entity that controlled a portion of NLNG shares.119 There existed
minimal government involvement in both U.S. v. Kellogg Brown &
Root and U.S. v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, indicating a shift in the
application of the FCPA towards the private sector and addressing
the actions prohibited by Article 21 of the UNCAC.120

C. IMPLICATION OF THE UNCAC: THE FCPA IS AN ANTIQUATED
DOCUMENT, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM BRIBERY
ACT
The globalized nature of today’s market enhances the potential for
corruption and bribery.121 Additionally, the increasing prevalence of
116. See Plea Agreement at 2, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC,
No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009) (stating that the defendant agreed to waive
indictment and plead guilty to a five count criminal information); Bixby, supra
note 6, at 131 (explaining that Kellogg Brown & Root pleaded guilty to one count
of conspiring to violate the FCPA and four counts of violating the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA); Information at 9, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root
LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2009) (reporting that count one is the
conspiracy to violate the FCPA).
117. Plea Agreement, supra note 116, at 39.
118. See id. at 38–39 (describing that the Nigerian National Petroleum
Corporation was a Nigerian government-owned company and was the largest
shareholder of NLNG; the U.S. government alleged that the Nigerian government
controlled NLNG through appointment of board members).
119. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 533 (affirming that a Nigerian
government-owned entity owned forty-nine percent of NLNG).
120. See Plea Agreement, supra note 116, at 7–9 (explaining that KBR
participated in a scheme to bribe employees of NLNG, a company whose largest
shareholder at forty-nine percent is a government-owned corporation); Indictment,
supra note 109, at 3–6 (communicating that the defendant is charged with bribing
employees of companies over which the Vietnamese government exercised
control).
121. See George et al., supra note 69, at 25 (discussing how “in today’s world,
goods, ideas and capital move across national borders with ease” and nations at
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government intervention in the economy correlates with increasing
occurrences of corrupt business practices.122 This trend of corrupt
business practices propagates the belief that bribery is an inevitable
aspect of doing business.123 Because the nature of today’s economy
makes it beneficial for corporations to engage in corrupt business
practices, multilateral conventions such as the UNCAC are needed to
counteract the norm of corruption.124 As an accepted aspect of
international business for many years, bribery has caused negative
repercussions spanning various industries.125
The United States was the first country to recognize international
corruption as harmful;126 today, it is widely recognized that the
negative consequences of corruption, such as distorting markets,
breeding cynicism among citizens, and undermining the rule of law,
must be prevented and corruption eliminated.127 The international
community as a whole must resist bribery in international business
transactions, though the practice remains deeply rooted in the very
nature of the market.128 While corruption in general always impedes
varying stages of development are interacting with each other to foster an
environment of corruption); Vlassis, supra note 15, at 126 (stating that the
“problem of corruption is systematic rather than individual” and that in today’s
economy, since “only a very small number of companies are practically able to
carry out the work, the ground is fertile for corrupt practices”).
122. Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across
Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 413, 421 (2007) (stating that theorists have suggested
that “where government intervention in the economy is high, the scope of
corruption increases”).
123. See id. at 423 (explaining that businesses located in developing countries
are more likely to contribute to the spread of corruption “by assuming pay-offs and
connections are inevitable facts of doing business”).
124. See Babu, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing how the system of international
trade was conducive to corruption, the practice being seen as “quite normal and
legal” in most countries).
125. See id. at 1 (suggesting that international corruption not only impedes the
government’s ability to provide services to its citizens, but also jeopardizes the
development of a country).
126. See George et al., supra note 69, at 3–4 (indicating that the FCPA was the
first of its kind in the realm of international bribery law).
127. Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at 76.
128. See Vlassis, supra note 15, at 126 (positing that bribery has detrimental
effects in both developing and developed countries); George et al., supra note 69,
at 9 (stating that the shifting attitude towards international corruption in business
has been caused, in part, by an awareness “brought about by the globalization of
business and security transactions, that the economic costs of corruption are too
high”).
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economic development, private sector bribery specifically is
problematic and must be monitored.129 Therefore, a multilateral
agreement such as the UNCAC is crucial in the movement to deter
bribery in international business transactions;130 in order to impart
the changes necessary to cure the deficiencies caused by bribery,
however, the UNCAC must be fully supported by all of its
signatories.
United States federal law will not encompass the full scope of the
UNCAC anti-bribery provisions until the United States shares in the
goals of the Convention.131 Globalization has created problems that
must be addressed on a supranational, rather than national, scale,
leading to varying values on private sector bribery. 132 The increasing
reliance on multilateral treaty instruments for addressing serious
international problems will not motivate the United States to alter the
FCPA to satisfy the anti-bribery criminalization provisions of the
UNCAC as long as the United States refuses to take a global
approach to the criminalization of bribery.133
The United States commitment to the FCPA restricts the United
States from accepting and implementing international treaty

129. See Boswell, supra note 2, at 1165–66 (suggesting that the costs of
corruption go beyond the common capital loss, namely, undermining democracy,
threatening effective development, and jeopardizing free market values); Rohlfsen,
supra note 2, at 152–53 (listing several repercussions of corruption); UNCAC,
supra note 11, pmbl. (stating “that corruption is no longer a local matter but a
transnational phenomenon that affects all societies and economies, making
international co-operation to prevent and control it essential”).
130. See generally Babu, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that in recent years, since
corruption in international business transactions has begun receiving global
attention, there has been an unprecedented effort to adopt international anticorruption instruments within a relatively short period of time).
131. See Webb, supra note 45, at 226 (suggesting that the UNCAC will be
successful when its signatories share its values).
132. See Delaney, supra note 122, at 423 (citing Anne-Marie Slaughter’s
suggestion that although “globalization has brought about a raft of problems that
can only be addressed on a global scale” there is still resistance against the attempt
to locate power above the state); see also Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at
82 (stating that although it is a difficult task, the importance of creating a
worldwide anticorruption framework justifies the efforts).
133. See generally Shirley V. Scott, The Political Interpretation of Multilateral
Treaties: Reconciling Text with Political Reality, 5 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 103,
104 (2007) (“The international community has come to rely on the multilateral
treaty instrument for addressing some of its most serious problems.”).
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provisions that are clearly beyond the boundary of the original goals
of the FCPA, such as private-to-private bribery.134 As the first Act to
criminalize bribery in international commercial transactions, the
FCPA proved an influential factor in establishing the structure of
subsequent multilateral anti-bribery agreements.135 Given the
FCPA’s history of influence, the United States is reluctant to
acknowledge its inadequacies and cede its influence in favor of a
more global perspective.136 The FCPA cannot satisfy the bribery
provisions of the UNCAC. Furthermore, the U.S. government’s
commitment to the original conception of the FCPA prevents the
FCPA from becoming the modern domestic legislation needed by the
United States to satisfy the anti-bribery obligations of the UNCAC.137
Due to the United States’ refusal to allow the FCPA to progress
enough to meet modern requirements—such as the need to address
private sector bribery—the FCPA does not fully meet the standard
set by the UNCAC anti-bribery provisions.138
The United Kingdom, in order to update its anti-bribery regime,
has passed the UK Bribery Act.139 The UK Bribery Act is the United
Kingdom’s effort to stay abreast of international developments
regarding corruption in international business transactions.140 In
134. See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 69, at 85 (suggesting that each
country will have to overcome its long-standing internal cultural problems in order
to improve the enforcement of its anticorruption legislation and make the global
anticorruption movement more likely to succeed).
135. See George et al., supra note 69, at 18 (arguing that the FCPA has served
as an important model for other multilateral organizations and nations in creating
their own anticorruption laws).
136. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 305 (describing the FCPA as the very first
national legislation targeting international corruption and explaining how the
FCPA has had global influence).
137. See Webb, supra note 45, at 222–23 (theorizing that governments comply
with treaties because they are committed to the ideas embodied in the treaty, not
because they expect a reward for their compliance).
138. See id. at 213 (stating that the United States resisted the desire of the
European Union, Latin America, and the Caribbean during the UNCAC
negotiations to incorporate a provision criminalizing private sector bribery).
139. Bonneau, supra note 63, at 384 (observing that, in response to
international criticism and in recognition of its confusing and outdated anti-bribery
regime, the British government launched a complete legislative overhaul which
ultimately resulted in the UK Bribery Act).
140. See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 261–62 (stating that the Bribery Act is
the latest anti-corruption legislation attempting to comply with the globalized
standard).
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updating its legislation, the United Kingdom has gone further than
the FCPA, reaching a wider range of corrupt conduct.141
The nature and purpose of the UK Bribery Act, being parallel to
that of the FCPA, lends itself to a comparison with the FCPA.142
While comparable to the FCPA in certain respects, the UK Bribery
Act reflects the growing trend to move beyond the FCPA in favor of
implementing more comprehensive anti-bribery legislation.143 The
UK Bribery Act has created new theories of liability for the
international criminalization of foreign bribery.144
The UK Bribery Act criminalizes the bribery of foreign officials,
as the FCPA does.145 The language of the provision is reflective of
the FCPA, as both require the same elements for the offense of
bribery of a foreign official.146 The UK Bribery Act is more
comprehensive than the FCPA, however, due to its broader scope
and its encompassing of the criminalization of purely private-toprivate bribery.147 The UK Bribery Act surpasses its American
counterpart by prohibiting private bribery between businessmen that
occurs both domestically and overseas.148
141. See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 388–89 (discussing the uncertainty
surrounding the UK Bribery Act and its application since it reaches more conduct
than the FCPA).
142. See id. at 386 (asserting that the Bribery Act is an example of the export of
the FCPA model abroad); Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 278 (stating that the
Bribery Act, unlike the FCPA, “extends its reach to bribes made in the private
sector, both domestically and abroad”).
143. See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 395 (arguing that the United State’s FCPA
had long been a model for international criminalization of foreign bribery, but that
some countries like the United Kingdom have begun to move beyond the FCPA).
144. See id. at 395–96 (stating that the United Kingdom’s anti-bribery laws
create new theories of liability).
145. See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 263 (stating that the Bribery Act’s
provision against bribing foreign officials provides a direct analogue to the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions); Bonneau, supra note 63, at 386 (observing that
the Bribery Act established a discrete offense of bribery of foreign public
officials).
146. Bonneau, supra note 63, at 386 (showing that the UK Bribery Act lists the
elements established by the FCPA for the offense of bribery of a foreign public
official).
147. See id. at 391 (suggesting that the UK Bribery Act represents a more
comprehensive approach to the prevention of bribery than the FCPA and also may
extend the British extraterritorial jurisdictional reach beyond that of the FCPA).
148. See id. (stating that the Bribery Act extends jurisdiction and criminalizes
bribery outside of the foreign official context).
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The UK Bribery Act serves as an example that anti-bribery
provisions can encompass both public and private sector bribery.
Conversely, the UK Bribery Act has received criticism for its
ambiguous language, a criticism shared by the FCPA.149 In an effort
to clarify the ambiguity, the Ministry of Justice released guidelines
that have, in effect, undermined the innovative features of the UK
Bribery Act by suggesting that it will not be strictly enforced. 150 The
ultimate effects of the UK Bribery Act are yet to be seen; regardless
of its limits, however, by including a provision addressing private
sector bribery, the UK Bribery Act marks advancement in antibribery legislation yet to be reached by the United States.151 These
differences will ultimately affect the impact of the UK Bribery
Act.152 A comparison between the UK Bribery Act and the FCPA
demonstrates the inability of the FCPA to apply fully in the private
sector without the inclusion of language targeted at strictly-private
sector bribery, thus definitively restricting United States
incorporation of the UNCAC private sector bribery prohibitions of
Article 21.153

D. THE NEGOTIATION OF THE UNCAC SIGNALS THE UNITED
STATES’ UNWILLINGNESS TO STRAY FROM THE STRUCTURE OF THE
FCPA, THEREBY PREVENTING FULL INCORPORATION OF THE
SCOPE OF THE UNCAC ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS
Including a provision against bribery in the private sector proved
one of the most contentious issues during the UNCAC
149. See id. at 401 (asserting that the UK Bribery Act has the “same problem
with ambiguity” as the FCPA).
150. See id. at 403 (suggesting that, in an attempt to respond to the fears of
British corporations that they would be subjected to “draconian enforcement” of
the new Bribery Act, these guidelines make clear that the act was not designed to
“bring the full force of criminal law to bear upon well run commercial
organisations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf”).
151. See Dunst et al., supra note 61, at 262 (conveying that the UK Bribery Act,
in addition to outlawing bribery of foreign public officials, features much broader
anti-bribery restrictions than the FCPA—namely, extending liability to bribes
perpetrated in a private, commercial setting).
152. See id. (predicting that the UK Bribery Act’s impact on multinational
corporations will largely depend on how the Act differs from the FCPA, which is
the incumbent anti-corruption regime for the multinational corporate community).
153. See Bribery Act § 1, c. 23 (2010) (criminalizing private sector bribery by
including a provision specifically prohibiting the bribery of “another person”).
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negotiations.154 The strong desire of the European Union (“EU”) and
the Latin American and Caribbean States to criminalize bribery in
the private sector was met with staunch objections from the United
States.155 The concern that limiting the scope of the Convention
would adversely affect its implementation did not deter the United
States from protesting the inclusion of a provision that, textually, was
blatantly different from the FCPA.156
The lack of U.S. domestic legislation addressing the issue of
purely private sector bribery, though an issue of global concern,
prevented the United States from supporting the provision.157 The
United States’ opposition to what is now Article 21 appeared
contradictory to its previous leading role in promoting the
establishment of multilateral anti-bribery agreements.158 The United
States claimed that a provision criminalizing purely private sector
bribery could put United States citizens at risk for lawsuits in foreign
courts and therefore would not be supported by the United States.159
The United States’ protection of the private sector leaves no room for
advancement beyond the confines of the public foreign officials
language of the FCPA.160 The dogmatic approach taken by the
154. Webb, supra note 45, at 213.
155. See id. at 213 (stating that the EU led the campaign to criminalize bribery
in the private sector and was supported by the Latin American and Caribbean
States); Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115.
156. See Webb, supra note 45, at 213 (stating that during the negotiations, the
representatives in support of including private sector bribery in the convention
argued that adopting a limited approach that only targeted the public sector would
“adversely affect the implementation of the future convention”).
157. See id. (stating that, in opposing the inclusion of the prohibition of private
sector bribery, the U.S. representative explained that private sector bribery was not
a crime in the United States); Babu, supra note 3, at 31 (asserting that while the
text of the UNCAC makes it clear that private sector corruption is a major global
concern, the provision on corruption in purely private conducts was “watereddown” in order to obtain passage).
158. See Webb, supra note 45, at 213 (observing that the United States’
position is surprising given that the United States was the leader in the movement
against international bribery).
159. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (arguing that the United States
forcefully opposed a provision that criminalized bribery in purely private contexts
because it feared the potential ramifications of lawsuits against U.S. citizens in
foreign courts).
160. See Babu, supra note 3, at 31 (suggesting that, because of the protective
approach taken by the developed countries towards the private sector, the provision
on criminalizing purely private conduct was made non-mandatory in order to
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United States towards the FCPA limits the United States’ ability to
implement progressive provisions of multilateral agreements that
recognize the need to prohibit bribery outside of the realm of public
foreign officials.161
The disagreements during the negotiations, which reached no
consensus, indicate the improbability of U.S. federal law fully
encompassing the UNCAC’s anti-bribery provisions.162 In order to
settle this dispute, the parties reached a compromise that
incorporated a provision criminalizing private sector bribery within
the UNCAC, made non-mandatory to appease the United States.163
The United States will not satisfy the non-mandatory provision
criminalizing private sector bribery until it is willing to alter its
domestic legislation.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Many experts agree that bribery “remains a routine business
practice for too many companies and runs throughout their business
dealings, not just those with public officials.”164 UNCAC Article 21
has acknowledged and codified the emerging problem of bribery in
the private sector.165 The FCPA, however, fails to fully address the
prohibitions of Article 21; therefore, the United States must take
additional measures to incorporate the complete set of UNCAC anti-

increase the chance of passage).
161. See Webb, supra note 45, at 213–14 (stating that the FCPA only applies to
bribes paid abroad in private-to-public contexts rather than private-to-private
transactions).
162. See Vlassis, supra note 15, at 129 (arguing that for a provision of a
multilateral agreement to be effective, the international community must sustain
efforts to attain consensus).
163. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 115 (reiterating that, due to the
disagreement over private sector bribery, a compromise was struck that
criminalized private-to-private corruption; however, the provision was not made
mandatory); Webb, supra note 45, at 214 (stating that U.S. views ultimately
prevailed, given that the provision on criminalizing bribery in the private sector
was made non-mandatory).
164. Robinson, supra note 9, at 321–22 (quoting Huguette Labelle, the Chair of
the Board of Directors of Transparency International).
165. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (discussing the inclusion of
private sector bribery prohibitions in the UNCAC and asserting that the similarity
of the public and private sector prohibitions reflect the “gradual convergence of
both sectors”).
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bribery provisions. The domestic legislation of any UNCAC
signatory should criminalize bribery in order to comply fully with
UNCAC Article 21.166

A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD AMEND ITS LEGISLATION
The United States can take various measures to address its failure
to incorporate the anti-bribery prohibition of UNCAC Article 21
within federal legislation. One option is to incorporate compliance
with the UNCAC through the FCPA. U.S. enforcement agencies
could further extend the application of the FCPA and apply the Act
within the purely-private sector.167 An updated set of guidelines,
which would serve to notify businesses that the FCPA will apply in
an extended amount of circumstances, would allow businesses to
implement internal procedures to avoid potential FCPA actions.
Additionally, the United States could amend the FCPA to formally
expand its scope and make it applicable to private sector bribery. 168
The FCPA previously has been amended in order to adjust to
contemporary standards.169 Amending the FCPA in response to the
increasing global concern regarding private sector bribery would not
represent a drastic shift away from FCPA precedent.170

B. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD MAKE CHANGES TO THE
UNCAC TO INCREASE COMPLIANCE WITH ITS BRIBERY
PROVISIONS
The UNCAC also could compel United States’ compliance with
its anti-bribery provisions by making Article 21 mandatory or
166. UNCAC, supra note 11, at 19 (articulating that each state party shall
consider criminalizing bribery in the private sector).
167. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494–95 (suggesting that the scope of the
FCPA has already expanded to some extent through enforcement).
168. See id. at 502 (discussing how FCPA amendments have twice been utilized
to clarify and strengthen the FCPA’s provisions).
169. See Bixby, supra note 6, at 97–98 (discussing the origins of the 1998
amendment and explaining that in 1977 when the FCPA was first enacted the
United States was the only country with such a prohibition, though as time went on
the world economy and the international attitude towards corruption changed,
prompting the FCPA to adapt).
170. See generally Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 109 (arguing that, given
the growth of the private sector in some countries and the growing influence of
multinational corporations, “it would have been negligent to refuse to criminalize
corruption in both sectors”).
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enforcing sanctions on noncompliance. By making Article 21 nonmandatory, signatories such as the United States are less likely to
implement those prohibitions into domestic law.171 By failing to
incorporate a standard level of compliance obligations throughout the
UNCAC, the complexity of the convention increases.172 That
complexity increases the likelihood that the UNCAC will create
diversity in national anti-corruption legislation rather than
uniformity.173 Additionally, the UNCAC does not impose sanctions
on its members for non-compliance.174 The possibility of sanctions
would motivate the United States to bring its laws into compliance
with the UNCAC’s anti-bribery provisions in order to avoid any
future sanctions.

C. ALTERNATIVE MODES THE UNITED STATES MAY PURSUE TO
INCREASE ITS COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNCAC BRIBERY
PROVISIONS
Additionally, the United States may adopt legislation specifically
addressing the issue of private sector bribery as prohibited by
UNCAC Article 21. The non-self-executing nature of many of the
UNCAC’s provisions, including Article 21, requires implementation
through the national laws of participating countries.175 The United
States may implement an original piece of legislation into domestic
law to criminalize private sector bribery. Alternatively, the United
States may adopt pre-existing international agreements that require
signatories to prohibit private sector bribery in international business
171. See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 35 (arguing that a permissive provision
may lead to uncertainties in regulating international corruption).
172. Lucinda A. Low, The Awakening Giant of Anticorruption Enforcement,
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 4 (May 4, 2006), http://www.steptoe.com/assets/
attachments/2599.pdf (explaining that the UNCAC has over a dozen different
levels of implementation obligations for State Parties, ranging from hard or
mandatory obligations to very soft obligations, and that these variants increase the
complexity of any analysis of the UNCAC).
173. See id. at 5 (arguing that the complexity of UNCAC implementation
obligations will create an even more diverse spectrum of national obligations).
174. See Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 140 (noting that the UNCAC does
not have any provisions on sanctions and does not penalize its members for noncompliance).
175. See Low, supra note 172, at 4 (stating that many of the provisions of the
UNCAC are not self-executing and “require implementation through the national
laws of participating countries, as well as national enforcement”).
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transactions. One such international agreement that would resolve
the discrepancy between the anti-bribery provisions of the UNCAC
and United States law is the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) Principles of International
Commercial Contracts
(“UNIDROIT Principles”).176
The
UNIDROIT Principles proscribe bribery in any international
business transaction, not limiting its scope to the public sector.177 By
implementing new provisions dealing specifically with private sector
bribery, the United States would fully incorporate the purpose of the
UNCAC anti-bribery provisions within federal law.

V. CONCLUSION
The FCPA is no longer an adequate doctrine that the United States
should use to meet modern international law standards regarding
bribery in international business transactions. The UNCAC strives to
create “global anticorruption standards and obligations.”178 An
agreement, however, is only as effective as the enforcement efforts
by its members.179 The FCPA, as the United States’ primary
anticorruption enforcement instrument, increasingly has been utilized
to combat bribery.180 The United States has pushed the boundaries of
176. UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, INT’L INST.
UNIFICATION PRIVATE L. art. 3.3.1 (2010), available at
http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/integralversion
principles2010-e.pdf (“(1) Where a contract infringes a mandatory rule, whether of
national, international or supranational origin, applicable under Article 1.4 of these
Principles, the effects of that infringement upon the contract are the effects, if any,
expressly prescribed by that mandatory rule. (2) Where the mandatory rule does
not expressly prescribe the effects of an infringement upon a contract, the parties
have the right to exercise such remedies under the contract as in the circumstances
are reasonable.”).
177. See id. art. 3.3.1 (using general language to prohibit the infringement of a
contract under any mandatory rule whether national, international, or
supranational).
178. Brunelle-Quraishi, supra note 1, at 106.
179. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 309 (positing that the effectiveness of
conventions is dependent upon a state’s willingness to alter the behavior of its
society).
180. See, Bixby, supra note 6, at 90 (discussing the FCPA’s evolution into
becoming the United States’ foremost instrument for combating white-collar
crime); Robinson, supra note 9, at 305 (stating that the United States prompted the
international combat of corruption by enacting the FCPA, nationally criminalizing
foreign bribery).
FOR
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the FCPA by applying it well beyond the context of bribery of
foreign public officials; consequently, the FCPA verges on
applicability against private sector bribery concurrent with Article 21
of the UNCAC.181 The tension between the language of the FCPA
and the increasing need for its application within the private sector
has created uncertainty that chills legitimate business investments.182
Although the scope of the FCPA has expanded significantly, the
Act is inefficient in meeting the purpose of the UNCAC embodied in
the Convention’s anti-bribery provisions, specifically the private
sector bribery prohibition of Article 21.183 The private sector bribery
provision of the UNCAC represents an enduring trend in
international law.184 The FCPA is no longer an adequate doctrine to
address bribery in international business transactions because of its
limitations relating to the private sector.185 If the United States wants
to remain a leader in the effort to combat international corruption, it
must make formal changes to bring itself in line with the new
international law standards transcribed in the UNCAC Article 21
private sector bribery prohibition.186 Until the U.S. government
ceases using the FCPA as a limiting factor to U.S. anti-corruption
policy, the United States will continue to fall behind in the sphere of
international anti-bribery efforts, which renders it impossible for the
United States to fully meet the UNCAC’s criminalization of

181. See Westbrook, supra note 5, at 494 (noting that because of a recent
radicalization of FCPA enforcement, which has altered the substantive law, a
number of companies have been prosecuted under the FCPA).
182. See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 394 (explaining that companies
complained that the FCPA created uncertainty that could jeopardize legitimate
business investment and put them at a disadvantage against competitors in
countries where anti-bribery statutes were not as strict).
183. See id. at 380 (stating that the broadening scope of liability will
significantly affect the regulated community).
184. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 303–04 (asserting that other countries
besides the United States have become more aggressive in their anti-corruption
laws and enforcement, not only within their own boundaries, but also globally).
185. See Dunst, supra note 61, at 286 (stating that the FCPA no longer leads the
worldwide anti-corruption enforcement effort due to the enactment of more
advanced legislation by other countries, i.e. the UK Bribery Act).
186. See Bonneau, supra note 63, at 396 (arguing that if the United States
would like to remain a leader in the field of international anti-corruption, it must
consider the possibility of amending the FCPA to bring it more in line with new
international standards).
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international bribery standards.187

187. See Makinwa, supra note 43, at 34–36 (discussing how the liberal model
of regulation does not motivate countries to alter their pre-existing legislation but
allows countries to participate at the level of requirement of their particular legal,
social, and political conditions).

